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Standby Letters of Credit
Over the last few years, the trend in bank regula-
tion toward more stringent capital adequacy
standards has constrained asset growth at the
nation's largest banks. At the same time, standby
letters of credit (SLCs) and other so-called off
balance sheet activities at these banks have
grown by leaps and bounds. Such activities are
not affected by the current capital-to-assets mea-
sures of capital adequacy because they are con-
tingent obligations and therefore not assets.
Nonetheless, these activities do expose bank
capital to varying degrees and kinds of risk.
Moreover, because the potential for leverage is
so great for these activities, regulators worry that
off balance sheet exposure in general, and SLC
exposure in particular, actually may increase
capital risk even as banks strengthen their capi-
tal ratios. This Letter examines the growth of
SLCs as well as the nature ofthe risks involved.
It concludes that, although banks apparently are
managing SLC risk carefully, some form of capi-
tal regulation of this activity is appropriate to
protect the assets ofthe federal deposit insur-
ance fund.
SlCs and guarantees
An SLC, like the more familiar commercial letter
of credit, is a contractual arrangement involving
three parties. The bank, as "issuer" ofthe letter
of credit, guarantees that the bank's customer
(the "account party") will meet an underlying
contractual obligation to the "beneficiary" or
else the bank will suffer the loss. However,
unlike the commercial letter of credit, which is
used to finance the shipment and storage of
goods, the SLC underwrites the beneficiary's risk
of loss should the account party fail to repay a
debt obligation or to complete a construction
project as required in the underlying contract.
Under the typical SLC, the bank makes payment
to the beneficiary only ifthe account party fails
to perform.
In general, the account party will choose to
arrange an SLC whenever the bank's fee is less
than the value of the guarantee to the benefici-
ary (as measured by the premium the beneficiary
is willing to pay for the account party's debt or
services with the SLC backing). In many cases,
the issuing bank has a comparative advantage
over the beneficiary in underwriting the risk of
default on the part of the account party. The
bank's costs usually are substantially lower
because the bank is better able to diversify the
risk associated with a given transaction and
because the bank enjoys certain economies in
credit evaluation. For example, because the
bank frequently has an ongoing relationship
with the account party, the marginal costof,
obtaining information is lower. As a result, par-
ticularly for the larger, top-rated banks, the ben-
eficiary generally is willing to pay a premium in
excess ofthe bank's fee for the value ofthe SLC
backing.
Agrowing market
SLCs outstanding have grown almost exponen-
tially over the last several years, from less than
$50 billion at year-end 1980 to more than $155
billion as of September 1985. At the 25 largest
banks, SLCs now total more than $120 billion,
up from less than $40 billion in 1980. This
growth is just one manifestation of a rapidly
growing general market for guarantee-type prod-
ucts.
In addition to the SLCs that banks offer, surety
and insurance companies are now offering such
guarantees as credit-risk coverages (which guar-
antee repayment of principal and interest on
debt obligations) and asset-risk coverages, such
as residual value insurance and systems perfor-
mance guarantees. This expansion in the types
of coverages offered has given insurance com-
panies a rapidly growing source of premium
income. Between 1980 and 1984, the insurance
industry's net premiums from such surety opera-
tions nearly doubled, rising from $900 million to
$1.6 billion.
Financial guarantees offered by other, spe-
cialized providers have grown rapidly as well.
Municipal bond insurance, for example, was
rare prior to 1981 but now supports an esti-
mated 29 percent, or $6.4 billion, of new issues
of long-term municipal bonds.FRBSF
Two factors account for the tremendous growth
in the market for financial guarantees in general,
and SLCs in particular. First, the growth over the
last ten to 15 years of direct-finance markets has
increased the credit-risk exposure of investors
who may prefer not to bear such risk. Such
direct-finance markets as the commercial paper
market have grown rapidly since the late 1960s
because borrowers are able to obtain funds
more cheaply from them than through inter-
mediaries such as banks.
The resulting decline in financial intermediation
has also meant that undiversified investors in
such markets must bear more creditrisk than if
they were to invest in the deposit liabilities of
commercial banks. Apparently, such an increase
in credit-risk exposure is unpalatable to at least
some portion ofthese investors because~ 15
percent of all dealer-placed taxable commercial
paper is supported by some sort of legally bind-
ing guarantee, and nearly all rated commercial
paper also is backed by a bank loan commit-
ment.
The second reason that financial guarantees
have grown rapidly over the last several years is
that overall economic risk has increased over
the same period. The rampant inflation ofthe
late 1970s, the increased volatility of interest
rates and business activity of the early 1980s,
and the unexpectedly sharp deceleration in the
rate of inflation in the middle 1980s have
caused wide swings in asset prices and returns
on investment. This increased variability, in turn,
implies an increase in credit, or default, risk
since investors are now less certain of a bor-
rower's ability to meet maturing obligations.
Consequently, the demand for instruments like
SLCs and other guarantees that reduce the risk to
the beneficiary has increased tremendously.
Bank involvement
Banks' involvement in this market is at once an
extension oftheir traditional lending business
and, because SLCs are not funded,a significant
departure from it. Like their lending business,
banks' issuance of SLCs entails the underwriting
of credit risk. In this area, banks enjoy certain
economies of specialization that make them
lower cost .issuers of financial guarantees.
Moreover, in contrast to insurance companies,
banks do not generally secure their guarantees
with a formal collateral arrangement with the
account party since they usually have the right
to debit the account party's deposit accounts.
This lack of a formal collateral arrangement
makes SLCs more attractive, but it also increases
the bank's risk somewhat.
Given the enormous increase in the demand for
guarantees, being low-cost issuers may be suffi-
cient explanation for the rapid growth of bank-
issued SLCs over the last several years.
However, banks also may have an incentive to
respond to this demand since they can over-
come binding regulatory constraints on their
lending activities by doing so. Because SLCs are
not funded and are therefore unaffected qy
reserve requirements, they represent a less costly
way of assuming a given level of credit risk.
Another important regulatory constraint that may
have given banks incentivetoissue SLCs is the
trend in bank regulation in recent years toward
tougher capital standards. For most firms, theory
suggests that stiffer capital regulation should not
affect behavior since firm value does not vary
with changes in leverage. Accordingly, any
decline in the return on equity associated with
tougher capital standards should be largely offset
by the reduced cost of debt resulting from
decreased leverage risk. For banks, however, the
existence of (underpriced) federal deposit insur-
ance means that a decline in leverage will not
reduce the risk to bank debt-holders, and there-
fore the cost of bank debt, by as much as it will
reduce the return on bank equity. The imposi-
tion of more stringent capital standards, then,
may induce banks to seek other ways to increase
leverage and to reduce the negative effects of
such regulation on share value.
Because SLCs and other off balance sheet
activities are contingent claims, much like insur-
ance contracts, they can be thought of as lia-
bilities even though they are not counted as
such on bank balance sheets. Thus, the presence
of these unbooked liabilities effectively increases
capital leverage. Moreover, because current
capital adequacy standards do not formally
accountfor this off balance sheet exposure,
banks may have special incentive to shift toward
the fee income generated by SLCs and other off
balance sheet activities that do not "use up"
capital.SLC risk
At the 25 largest banks, SLCs outstanding now
exceed capital by an average of 66 percent - a
sizeable exposure particularly if SLC risk is
positively correlated with these banks' loan risk.
Some observers, however, have suggested that
banks' SLC exposure may not be increasing
bank risk significantly. They argue that since SLC
fees are considerably lower than the fees banks
charge for loans with comparable terms, SLCs
must pose less risk to bank capital than loans.
They also point to substantially lower losses on
SLCs than loans and the widespread practice in
the banking industry of imposing generally
higher underwriting standards for SLCs than for
loans.
These findings must be interpreted with caution.
First, fees do not provide a measure of the
expectedreturn on equity. To a large extent,
loan fees are higher than SLC fees because loans
entail higher administrative and other expenses
than SLCs. After netting out these higher
expenses, loan and SLC fees probably would be
nearly equal, suggesting that the expected return
on, and the risk of, SLCs is at least as high as that
for loans.
Second, loss experience can be a misleading
measure of credit risk. For example, the
extremely low loss experience on SLCs backing
real estate investment trusts prior to 1974 may
have given bankers misleading signals about the
riskiness of such investments.
Instead, there are several reasons to believe that
SLCs pose significant capital risk. First, as noted
above, banks' SLC exposure may be partly the
result of an attempt to circumvent capital regula-
tion and increase effective leverage. Second,
unlike most term loans, SLCs do not have a for-
mal collateral agreement and, as such, provide
less contractual protection against loss in the
event ofdefault than loans.
Finally, evidence from debt markets also seems
to suggest that the growth in SLCs over the last
several years has not reduced capital risk. In a
study of the determinants of large bank CD rates,
Goldberg and Lloyd-Davies found that the mar-
ket tended to require higher CD rates in com-
pensation for increasing SLC-related leverage. At
the same time, these researchers found that SLCs
tended to be higher quality credits than loans,
suggesting that, on balance, SLCs pose about as
much risk to bank capital as loans.
Regulating SLCs
Currently, bank regulators place only limited
restrictions on banks' SLC activities. They
require that banks treat SLCs as loans for the
purposes of evaluating credit quality and cal-
culating loan concentrations. However, because
of the inherent riskiness of the SLC instrument as
well as the greater potential for capital leverage
with SLCs than with loans, some form of capital-
regulation of SLCs is appropriate.
The Federal Reserve Board has proposed that its
current capital regulation be supplemented by
risk-based capital guidelines that would
explicitly take into account the relative riskiness
ofbroad categories of bank assets and certain off
balance sheet items, including SLCs. These
guidelines would assign the same risk weight to
most SLCs as to loans. Under these supplemen-
tal guidelines, a bank with a large portfolio of
SLCs might be required either to raise additional
capital or reduce leverage by changing the com-
position of its asset and off balance sheet port-
folios. '
The advantage of these guidelines is that they
reduce banks' incentive to issue SLCs merely as
a means of increasing effective leverage and cir-
cumventing capital regulation. Although bankers
and their regulators will no doubt argue about
the appropriate risk weight to assign SLCs, in
concept, this approach does provide additional
guidance to bank examiners and stock analysts
as they evaluate capital adequacy and bank risk.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 203,343 1,063 12,304 6.4
Loans and Leases1 6 184,786 758 11,950 6.9
Commercial and Industrial 53,139 473 694 1.3
Real estate 66,552 65 3,675 5.8
Loans to Individuals 39,138 93 5,169 15.2
Leases 5,649 1 285 5.3
U. S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,686 297 - 538 - 4.7
OtherSecurities2 7,871 9 891 12.7
Total Deposits 204,662 3,029 8,324 4.2
Demand Deposits 52,498 3,589 4,355 9.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 34,971 1,206 5,750 19.6
OtherTransaction Balances4 15,785 - 428 2,563 19.3
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,379 - 131 1,407 1.0
Money Market Deposit
Accounts-Total 46,196 21 3,330 7.7
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 36,453 - 207 - 1,796 - 4.6
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 27,581 - 342 4,997 22.1
TwoWeek Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items not shown separately
7 Annualized percent change